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Abstract
How is it possible that models from game theory, which are typically highly idealised, can
be harnessed for designing institutions through which we interact? I argue that game theory
assumes that social interactions have a specific structure, which is uncovered with the help of
directed graphs. The graphs make explicit how game theory encodes counterfactual information
in natural collections of its models and can therefore be used to track how model-interventions
change model-outcomes. For model-interventions to inform real-world design requires the truth
of a causal hypothesis, namely that structural relations specified in a model approximate causal
relations in the target interaction; or in other words, that the directed graph can be interpreted
causally. In order to increase their confidence in this hypothesis, market designers complement
their models with natural and laboratory experiments, and computational methods. Throughout
the paper, the reform of a matching market for medical residents provides a case study for my
proposed view, which hasn’t been previously considered in the philosophy of science.
Keywords Economic engineering, market design, matching theory, NRMP, game theory,
models, causal graphs.
1 Introduction
While economists often take market outcomes as phenomena to be explained or predicted,
recent years have seen an increasing interest in market design. Instead of taking them as
given, economists in this field seek to bring about desirable outcomes by actively shaping, or
“engineering” markets. This practice poses interesting new challenges for the philosophy of
science.1 This paper is concerned with such a challenge: the way that economists qua market
1Market design also raises questions for moral philosophy, viz., according to what criteria market outcomes should
be considered desirable. See Li [2017] for a general treatment of ethics and market design, and van Basshuysen
[2017] for the ethics of a particular market design, namely a matching market for asylum. Here, I take criteria to be
exogenously given through policy goals.
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designers harness economic models.
While there has been a large debate among philosophers of science and economic theorists
on how economic models relate to their intended targets,2 this question takes an interesting
twist in the context of market design. One reason is that, since designers do not only model
markets but use these models to change the “rules” that govern those markets, this practice
directs attention to the way in which counterfactual information is encoded in the models used.
What can a model tell us about how a market outcome would change if the rules of the market
changed, and how can this information be used for market design? Second, in the debate, it has
been emphasised that economic models depend crucially on false assumptions, and isolate causal
mechanisms that are in the real world interfered with by distorting mechanisms, thus in the best
case representing stylised facts. But market design requires confidence in the prediction that a
design will perform well in the messy real world. How can models, possibly in combination with
other tools, establish such confidence?
I shall attempt to answer these questions with regards to an important class of economic
models, namely models from game theory. It is frequently emphasised that game theory plays
a vital role for design purposes. For example, Roth and Sotomayor [1990] write,
“It is this close observed connection between individual incentives and market be-
havior that suggests that, however game theory may need to be further developed
as a descriptive theory, it has a critical role to play in helping us to understand and
design the institutions through which we interact.”3
I shall take an institution as a case study, which hasn’t been previously considered in the
philosophy of science: the matching market that allows medical graduates in the US to find
training positions in public hospitals. In this market, the graduates state their preferences over
hospitals and the hospitals state their preferences over graduates, and an algorithm is used to
determine the matchings relative to the preferences submitted. In the 1990s, game theorists were
significantly involved in the design of a new algorithm which was commissioned as a response
to market failure.
How is it possible that game theoretic (GT) models informed the successful reform of this
market? I shall argue that these models assume that social interactions have a specific structure.
2Some examples are the following: Alexandrova [2006a, 2008], Alexandrova and Northcott [2009, 2015], Cartwright
[1989, 1999], Hausman [1992, 2015], Ma¨ki [2011, 2017], Morgan [2001, 2002], Reiss [2012], Rodrik [2015], Roth [1991,
2002], Rubinstein [2006, 2012], Schelling [2010], Spiegler [2015], Sugden [2000], Sutton [2002], Ylikoski and Aydinonat
[2014]. Moreover, Erkenntnis devoted a special issue, “Economic Models as Credible Worlds or as Isolating Tools?”
(2009), to this debate.
3It seems a fair interpretation that with “institution”, Roth and Sotomayor just mean “market” in this quote, since
it stems from a classic text on matching theory, i.e. the study of matching markets (see section 5). An alternative
reading is that institutions include markets in the sense that markets are institutions but not all institutions are
markets. Either interpretation fits my purpose to emphasise the importance of game theory for the design of markets.
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One of the contributions of this paper is to provide an account of GT models, which uncovers this
structure. I will show that directed graphs can be lifted quite naturally out of standard game-
theoretic practice, and the graphs reveal that game theory encodes counterfactual information
in natural collections of its models.
Once this has been done, graphs provide a particularly useful analysis from the perspec-
tive of policy-making. If the graph of the model can be interpreted as a causal graph, which
approximately describes a causal mechanism in effect in the target interaction, then the model-
interventions do accurately describe how interventions in the real world would change outcomes,
and this fact can be used to design markets.
To interpret the directed graph as a causal graph presupposes the truth of a causal hypoth-
esis: that the model represents a relevant causal mechanism, which is not significantly distorted
by other mechanisms. But what provides confidence in the truth of this hypothesis, given what
has been said above, that economic models make false assumptions and isolate mechanisms
which are typically interfered with by other mechanisms? Another look at the case study is
revealing: it shows that, in order to confirm causal hypotheses, the models used are in a specific
way complemented with natural, laboratory, and computational experiments.
This paper is organised as follows. In section (2), I introduce my case study, the matching
market for medical residents. In section (3), I put forward a directed graph of GT models.
The graph makes explicit how game theory encodes counterfactual information in collections
of models, a fact that explains the methodology of market design, which is object of section
(4). But the methodology poses the puzzle of how inferences from GT models to the real world
are established. In section (5), the case study is revisited to show how practitioners grapple
with this question, and what factors increase their confidence that their models would indeed
successfully guide the reform of the market. Section (6) discusses the lessons learned from the
case study within my account of GT models, and connects them to some of the literature on
economic models. Section (7) concludes.
2 The matching market for medical residents
The National Resident Matching Program (NRMP) is a clearinghouse that matches medical
graduates (“residents”) with training positions (“residencies”) in public hospitals in the US.
Residencies allow graduates to specialise in a specific medical branch, and they are a requirement
for practising as a physician. Residents and hospitals both submit preferences to the NRMP,
which uses an algorithm to determine the matchings. In the 1990s, the algorithm in use had
generated considerable discontent of prospective residents. The game theorist and later Nobel
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laureate Alvin Roth was commissioned to direct the design of a new matching algorithm. Since
this important case of market design has to date not been considered by philosophers of science,
I will describe the history and the reform of the market in some detail, based on Roth’s and his
collaborators’ accounts.4
Before the NRMP was established, the labour market for medical interns was a decentralised
market that had been subject to various market failures. For example, hospitals offered positions
to students in ever earlier stages of their medical studies in order to prevent other hospitals
from “snatching” interns first. By 1940, students were offered positions up to two years before
graduation, which was prejudicial for both hospitals and students: hospitals were facing high
uncertainty about the future performance in medical school of the students they hired, and
students were left under pressure to make career choices very early.
This situation changed after a reform had been implemented, which prescribed a maximum
time period before students’ graduation that the hospitals had to adhere to before offering
internships. This, however, led to different inefficiencies: when offers for internships were issued,
hospitals demanded that offer holders would accept offers in ever shorter time periods in order
to render it impossible for them to wait for preferred offers; and hospitals that didn’t send out
sufficiently many offers sufficiently early would frequently send out offers to students already in
a different internship – even though they may have preferred the later offer.
Eventually, in 1951, the NRMP was introduced as a response to the market failures. It
collects rank order lists (“ROLs”): lists that reflect the students’ preferences over the hospitals
they had previously had an interview with, and the hospitals’ preferences over the students
they had interviewed. The assignments are then determined algorithmically. Since students and
hospitals are free to decide whether to find residencies and residents, respectively, through the
centralised clearinghouse or on their own, high rates of voluntary participation in the system in
its early years (over 95 % ) can be interpreted as evidence for the well-functioning of the market
and the satisfaction of the agents participating in it.
However, over the years changes occurred in the market, which would eventually result in
a crisis of confidence of the applicants in the market. An example of such a change is that
initially, interns were predominantly male, and when female interns entered the market in the
1970s, there were increasing numbers of married couples who graduated from medical school
together.5 Members of couples often have interrelated preferences, particularly to find positions
4Roth’s interest in the market dates back at least to Roth [1982]. Technical or historical accounts can be found
in Roth [1984], Roth and Sotomayor [1990], Roth and Peranson [1999], Roth [2002, 2003, 2013, 2015], Kojima et al.
[2013], amongst others.
5The integration of couples is only one of four types of “match variations” (Roth and Peranson [1999]) and the
only that I shall discuss. Other examples are hospitals with interlinked numbers of positions such as, say, five in the
neurology department if internal medicine fills all its positions, fewer otherwise.
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close to one another. For example, even if a member of a couple prefers, say, a position in
Boston to a position in Los Angeles, other things being equal, these preferences may switch if
their partner attains a position close to L.A.
The initial algorithm could not accommodate such desires because it would process only
single preference lists. The NRMP modified the system to permit couples to hand in a pair of
ROLs together and to specify a “leading member”. The algorithm would then match the leading
member first and next the preference list of the other member would be edited to eliminate
positions far from that of the leading member. However, this rather ad-hoc modification of the
system could not prevent rates of participation from dropping.
The accommodation of couples in the system was not the only challenge the NRMP was
facing. Another one was that the numbers of students relative to residencies offered increased
substantially over the years,6 which led to matchings being less favourable for students. And
more examples could be added. In the 1990s, the dissatisfaction among applicants – as expressed
by various student associations – was at a peak. Many claimed that the algorithm would
show favouritism to the hospitals at the expense of the graduates; and there was a rumor
among applicants that one could ‘game the system’ by submitting ROLs that wouldn’t truthfully
reflect their preferences. As a consequence, some student associations requested a change of the
algorithm that was used to determine the matchings, or that the applicants be given more
information on how to hand in their ROLs strategically.
The Board of Directors of the NRMP reacted in 1995 and commissioned the design of a new
algorithm for conducting the matchings. The goal of the design was an algorithm that would
remove agents’ incentives to make arrangements outside the system. Moreover, the matchings
should be as favourable as possible for applicants, while keeping to a minimum the possibility
of strategic behaviour. Roth directed the design of the algorithm which is now known as the
“Roth-Peranson algorithm”.7 It was first implemented in 1998, has been working successfully
since, and has been adopted by numerous labour market clearinghouses. The question I seek to
answer is, how did GT models inform the successful reform of the matching market?
3 Making game theoretic counterfactuals explicit
Before I present my account of GT models, two general clarifications are in order: one concerning
what GT models can be used for, and one on the level of description at which I take them to
6In the year that the algorithm was introduced, the number of internships offered was almost twice the number of
residents who could take them. This changed partly because foreign medical residents were allowed to participate in
the matching programme in the 70s (Roth [1984]).
7Elliott Peranson is founder and president of the National Matching Services Inc., a company devoted to provide
matching solutions by implementing what they advertise as a “Nobel Prize acclaimed algorithm”.
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operate. In the most general terms, in social interactions such as markets, individuals face
choices which collectively result in outcomes with certain features (Buchanan [2001]). In our
case study, individuals’ choices are to hand in ROLs (or not to take part in the centralised
market), and the outcome is a matching with certain features, e.g. Pareto-efficiency with respect
to the ROLs submitted. This leads me to my first clarification: rather than understand a
particular matching in a particular year, we are interested in a general feature of a matching
market, e.g. what market failures are likely to occur in markets that share a certain structure.
An institutional design must be reliable in the sense that, even if it is to organise a one-shot
interaction (as would be the case if the NRMP were to clear only once), at least in principle it
should be possible to repeat the interaction and achieve a similar outcome. I take it that the
level of description that GT models adopt is what types of social interactions result in what
types of outcomes. Accordingly, in the following I shall mean types of events with “outcomes”,
“choices”, etc.
Second, to explain outcomes, which eventually makes policy-making possible, requires un-
derstanding two things: how outcomes follow from combinations of agents’ choices, and what
brings about those choices in the first place. The former constitutes the rules of the market
which are usually publicly observable. The latter includes agents’ private information: their
beliefs, desires and their reasoning processes, which together constitute their motivations, or
incentives to make choices.8 The two are intertwined: the rules of a situation influence agents’
incentives to act in certain ways – which in turn may make it desirable for a planner to change
the rules of the situation. Game theory operates where the two domains, the private and the
public, interact.9 This will be a recurrent theme in the following, and it should give a prima
facie reason for why models from game theory are relevant to the case study.
But what are GT models? In my proposal, they are formal structures of sets and relations
between them. To acquire meaning, interpretations connect the formal structures to target
interactions. This will be subject of the next section; for now, suffice it to say that the intended
interpretation is, roughly, that the sets correspond to the agents involved, their possible choices,
their beliefs, desires, and reasoning processes; and the relations between them reflect how they
result in choices, as well as which outcomes result from combinations of choices. Thus, they
include things in both the private and the public domains.
Market designers treat institutions as variables to be intervened on (cf. Guala [2007]). I take
this view literally, and I shall argue that the structure which GT models impose on the defined
8Both terms can be found in the literature and I use them synonymously.
9Cf. “Game theory seeks to understand economic environments by analysing how the motivations of the agents
interact with the ‘rules of the game’ – that is, the customs, rules, procedures, and constraints around which a market
may be organized” (Roth and Sotomayor [1990][p. 10]).
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BELIEFS RATIONALITY
OUTCOME
Figure 1: Graph of GT models. The nodes in the graph are variables and edges represent functional
relations.
entities can be described by directed graphs, as in Figure 1. The graph consists in a set of nodes
and directed edges between the nodes. As is standard in the literature on directed graphs, call
node X the parent of node Y and Y the child of X if there is an edge from X to Y . Call
nodes without children, leaf nodes, and nodes without parents, root nodes. The nodes represent
random variables, each of which takes values in a specific class of sets, which will be defined
below. I shall talk interchangeably of nodes and random variables whenever this does not cause
confusion. The value of a given child is a function of the values of its parents. For example, the
graph specifies that OUTCOME is a function of GAME, BELIEFS, and RATIONALITY.
Informally, the graph can be described as follows. Starting from the top, there is a GAME
FORM variable that takes as value the “rules” that govern an interaction and a PREFERENCES
variable that takes as value the players’ preference relations. Together, these variables define
the value of a GAME variable: a particular game, for example, a Prisoners’ Dilemma in normal
form. Together with a RATIONALITY and a BELIEFS variable, GAME defines the outcome,
or set of outcomes, of the game. This is specified by the OUTCOME variable which is the only
leaf node in the graph.
What justifies my claim that, if a GT model accurately represents a social interaction, then
so does my graph of it? I take it to indirectly confirm my account that it will shed light on
the practice of market design. For now, I shall show that the graph follows naturally from the
way in which game theory is taught. Standard textbooks (e.g. Osborne and Rubinstein [1994])
usually start by defining a game in normal form Γ =< N, (Ai), (i) >, where N is a set of
players and for each i ∈ N , Ai is a set of available actions and i, her preference relations over
action profiles A = ×i∈NAi.10 For now, think of the GAME variable in the graph as ranging
over different games Γ in the mathematical sense above. Notice that at this stage, all of these
structures are purely mathematical, with no presumption about what they represent in the real
world, in spite of the loaded language used in the standard definitions.
In textbooks, the definition of a game is usually followed by the introduction of solution con-
10For ease of exposition I shall ignore mixed strategies here and in the following. They could be added in the
standard way: assume that players’ preferences range over lotteries on action profiles. Then, if their preferences
follow the von Neumann-Morgenstern axioms, they can be represented by payoff functions ui : A −→ R, for all i ∈ N .
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cepts, mappings from games to (sets of) action profiles, which select a value for each Ai. Then,
the epistemic conditions are presented that constitute solution concepts. In the abstract, this too
is simply a mathematical statement about how certain conditions constrain the possible values
that the Ai can take. These constraints are represented by the BELIEFS and RATIONALITY
nodes in the graph, whose values together with GAME define the value of OUTCOME, which
is a set of action profiles. For example, the most prominent solution concept, Nash Equilibrium,
is obtained, roughly, if the RATIONALITY variable takes as value that every player chooses an
optimal strategy, and that the BELIEFS variable takes as value that players hold correct be-
liefs about the game they are playing (this includes complete information about the opponents’
preferences) and the rationality of the opponents, and there is common belief in the players’
strategy choices (cf. Aumann and Brandenburger [1995]). Or, consider the case in which the
BELIEFS variable takes as value not that players know the opponents’ preferences but that
probability distributions over preferences are commonly known. This constitutes a game of
incomplete information, and the solution concept is Bayesian Nash equilibrium. In order to
define players’ rationality and beliefs as set-theoretic entities, epistemic models must be intro-
duced (which would lead us too far astray, but cf. Aumann and Brandenburger [1995]). The
lower part of the graph – the variables BELIEFS, GAME, RATIONALITY, and OUTCOME –
reflects the standard definition of a game plus solution concept, which result in action profiles.
A more general case is that the OUTCOME variable ranges not over action profiles but
over consequences of action profiles. This case can be accommodated if we add to the game a
set C of consequences and g : A −→ C a function from action profiles to consequences. The
preferences (i)i∈N range over C. So in this general case which we shall operate with here,
the GAME variable is a tuple < N, (Ai), (i), C, g >, and the OUTCOME variable ranges over
C. Finally, we distinguish between two parts of the GAME variable: the preferences, and the
remaining parts. Accordingly define two separate variables: a PREFERENCES variable that
ranges over (i), and a GAME FORM variable that ranges over < N, (Ai), C, g >. I choose to
present these as the exogenous variables that map into the GAME variable because, since we are
concerned with the design of institutions, it will be important to distinguish the “public” parts
of the game which can be changed or imposed as a policy (the game form) from the “private”
parts that cannot (the players’ preferences).
The following example uses a simple game to illustrate the structure of GT models.
Example 1 (Prisoners’ Dilemma and Prisoners’ Delight). Suppose GAME FORM takes as
value the interaction specified in Table 1. There are two players, Row and Col, who can both
cooperate or defect. The four possible action profiles result in consequences a, b, c, and d.
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GAMEFORM = cooperate defect
cooperate a b
defect c d
Table 1: GAME FORM takes as value a two-player interaction between Row and Col that can both
choose to cooperate or defect. The action profiles result in outcomes a, b, c, or d, as specified in the
table. Together with the players’ preferences, this game form determines a game.
GAMEFORM ′ = cooperate defect
cooperate a c
defect b d
Table 2: A different value of GAME FORM as a result of a tax on defection and subsidy on
cooperation.
Suppose that PREFERENCESRow = c  a  d  b, and PREFERENCESCol = b 
a  d  c. This determines the value of the GAME variable: we have a Prisoners’ Dilemma.
Suppose RATIONALITY takes as value that players play optimal strategies, and BELIEFS, that
they hold correct beliefs about the game. (Note that beliefs about the opponent’s rationality don’t
matter in this case because defect is a strictly dominant strategy for both players.) Then, both
players will defect and OUTCOME takes value d.
Now, suppose that the value of GAME FORM changes as specified in Table 2. The new
game form could be the result of a change of an institutional rule, e.g. a tax on defection
against cooperation, or a subsidy on the converse behaviour.
This induces a different game (“Prisoners’ Delight”) in which cooperation is a dominant
strategy for both players. If we suppose that RATIONALITY and BELIEFS are held fixed at
the values of before, then OUTCOME changes from d to a, which is the second-best as opposed
to the second-worst outcome for both players.
The example shows that game theory encodes counterfactual information in natural collec-
tions of its models: it allows to calculate what the corresponding outcomes are for different
values of variables. This is not so visible in the standard GT language, but the directed graph
proposal provides a way to make this property explicit. The counterfactual information en-
coded in a model is at the core of my argument of how game theory can be harnessed for
market design. The intuition is that designers use this information to intervene on the GAME
FORM variable: game forms are designed which “force” players to produce outcomes that are
considered desirable.
Before moving on to a more thorough consideration of market design, I should hasten to
delineate the scope of the graph in Figure 1. Game theory is a family of diverse models, and
it must be made clear which class of models the graph is intended to capture. Two points of
clarification are required here. First, the graph is intended primarily to capture the structure
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of one-shot games in normal form. Extensive games can be used to additionally model social
interactions where players’ actions are sequential. In such interactions, players update their
beliefs as the play unrolls. Extensive games can capture such additional information, which
makes possible more refined solution concepts such as subgame perfect equilibrium. While I see
no reason that extensive games cannot be captured by extending the graph to allow players to
update beliefs, this is not within the scope of this paper.
Second, while extensive games contain information which the graph is not intended to cap-
ture, cooperative games get by with less information than games in normal form, and by sup-
pressing some information, the graph can capture these games. This is important to note because
market designers frequently exert tools from both cooperative and noncooperative game theory
(the matching market is a case in point). In the cooperative case, the GAME variable ranges
over cooperative games. What distinguishes the two kinds of games is the different levels of
abstraction they assume: whereas non-cooperative game theory aims at giving a detailed de-
scription of the situation, namely the players’ actions that result in outcomes, cooperative game
theory suppresses information regarding actions, and characterises the rules of the game through
the payoffs that players and coalitions of players can achieve.11 Moreover, cooperative game
theory assumes that outcomes are enforceable. Instead of following from assumptions on agents’
rationality and beliefs, cooperative solution concepts are characterised axiomatically. Thus, a
cooperative solution concept determines the value of the OUTCOME variable as a function of
the GAME variable alone. The values of the RATIONALITY and BELIEFS variables are not
specified. I call a graph in which the values of some variables are not specified, an incomplete
graph. The graph of a cooperative game is incomplete in this sense.
The relation between the noncooperative and the cooperative theory is provided by the
so-called Nash programme (cf. Nash [1953]). It asks to specify noncooperative models whose
equilibria coincide with cooperative solutions. For example, the core, one of the most widely
used solution concepts in cooperative game theory, can be implemented through a variety of
noncooperative procedures of proposal-making, given that some anonymity conditions are sat-
isfied (cf. Serrano [2005]). In terms of graphs, what happens in a specific result of the Nash
programme is that the incomplete graph of a cooperative game is extended to a complete, non-
cooperative one by adding players’ actions in the GAME variable, and specifying values for the
BELIEFS and RATIONALITY variables. The value of the OUTCOME variable remains the
11A simple example of a cooperative game is a coalitional form game with transferable utility, which is defined as
a pair < N, v > where N is a set of players and v a characteristic function that specifies, for each non-empty subset
S of N , the payoff profiles feasible for S. The theory then offers a variety of solution concepts, each a function that
associates any game < N, v > with a payoff vector that specifies each player’s payoff. In this case, the GAME variable
would range over < N, v >.
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same but as a consequence of the agents’ strategic actions.
4 From model-interventions to real world interven-
tions: market design, and challenges from the philoso-
phy of science
Market designers seek to realise outcomes that possess properties which a policy maker considers
desirable. They proceed by imposing institutional rules which exploit agents’ rational pursuit
of their individual goals. To predict how agents’ behaviour would adapt after a rule is changed,
they model social interactions as games. Within the model, different games can be compared
on the basis of how close their associated equilibria are to the policy goals in question, or more
precisely, to what are interpreted to be the policy goals within the model.
This practice can be helpfully clarified using the directed graph model of the previous section.
My proposal is that we view game forms as variables, whose values may determine particular
games. The policy-maker may then view their choice as over possible values of the game form,
each of which prescribes particular possible games, which they may ultimately impose on the
social system. Since game forms induce games, the former can be compared in lieu of the games
directly, with the goal of eventually imposing the game form chosen as a policy. In terms of our
graphical representation, the GAME FORM 12 variable is the variable where model-interventions
take place: different game forms are compared by calculating the equilibria of their associated
games and the extent to which they conform to their policy goals.
However, this methodology faces a challenge: in order to know what game is induced by
a game form, the value of the PREFERENCES variable must normally be specified. But the
designer does not know the agents’ preferences, and they may have incentives to obscure their
preferences so it is of no help to simply ask them. Indeed, one of the problems encountered in
our case study was precisely that agents were trying to “game the system” by handing in ROLs
strategically. Furthermore, in a market such as the NRMP which clears regularly, it may not be
known to the designer in advance how many agents there will be in the market. In short, the
challenge is that a game form may induce different games for different populations and different
types of players.
Market designers seek to overcome this problem by looking at variable types and populations
12In the context of design, game forms are called mechanisms – hence the term “mechanism design” for the part of
market design which is concerned with inventing mechanisms that implement social choice functions. I do not adopt
this terminology because I reserve the term “mechanism” for an explicitly causal meaning (see below). This choice of
terms is closer to standard philosophy of science terminology.
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of players. A game form is said to implement a property according to a solution concept if for
any possible combination of players and types, there is an action profile that is prescribed by
the solution concept, and the corresponding outcome satisfies the property. The game forms of
interest to the designer implement desirable properties, a methodology that I will interpret as
systematic robustness analysis below. The final step of the design is to select the game form
that is closest to implementing properties that are interpreted as the policy goals within the
model. If the design is successful, the rules which correspond to the chosen game form in the
model induce the intended policy goals in the real world.
The “if successful”-part in the final step poses a puzzle: what provides confidence in the
prediction that a design will perform as intended in the real world? A prediction of this kind
seems to be based on the hypothesis, roughly, that interventions within the model inform inter-
ventions in the real world in the sense that the latter interventions reliably establish outcomes
that resemble those in the model. So it would seem that what is presupposed is a causal hypoth-
esis. It can be split into two parts: (i) the structure of the model corresponds to a stable causal
mechanism in the real world; and (ii) the game form in the model implements properties that
correspond to the relevant policy goals. The truth of (i) and (ii) would justify confidence in the
prediction that a policy that corresponds to the chosen game form in the model, will produce
desirable outcomes.
The hypothesis can be made precise in terms of our graphical representation: what it says
is that the directed graph of a given model is a causal graph of its target interaction. In a
causal graph, the variables range over events in the real world, and the edges indicate causal
relationships.13 If the graph is a causal graph of the interaction that is being modelled, the values
of the variables are specific events which together constitute the interaction. For example,
the variable GAME FORM takes as value the event that a specific rule governs the target
interaction, that is, which choices are available to agents and how their choices jointly result in
an outcome. The PREFERENCES variable takes as value the event that agents have specific
preference relations. The BELIEFS variable takes as value the event that agents have specific
beliefs about the situation they are in, and their opponents’ reasoning processes. And so on.
In a causal graph, directed edges indicate direct causation:14 roughly, that there are different
values of the parent node such that changing it from one to another, the child node changes its
value from one to another, given that its other parent nodes are held fixed at specific values. If
13To formally show that it is in principle possible to interpret the graph in Figure 1 as a causal graph in the sense
of, e.g. Spirtes et al. [2000], we must specify a probability distribution over the graph which satisfies the causal
Markov condition and the minimality condition. These axioms are trivially satisfied by the standard GT textbook
interpretation of the nodes that I gave above.
14I do not wish to commit to a specific theory of causation. It should be clear though that theories in which
interventions figure prominently – such as Woodward [2003]’s theory – fit my account particularly well.
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the causal hypothesis is true and the graph can be interpreted causally, the structural relations
in the model describe a causal mechanism effective in the real-world interaction. Moreover, the
hypothetical interventions in the model reveal information about how the outcome of the target
interaction would change as the rules that govern it change.
But how is the causal hypothesis justified, the truth of which would license the epistemic
step from the model to the real world? What establishes confidence that we can treat the
graph as a causal graph? An answer to this question would help explain how some serious
and well-known challenges from the philosophy of science are met in the context of market
design. These challenges have been presented eloquently by Nancy Cartwright, among others.
In Cartwright [2009], she argues that typical models in economics face two problems. First, they
are overconstrained, i.e. they depend crucially on false assumptions. These assumptions cannot
be relaxed without considerably weakening the result of the model. In terms of our graphical
representation, the values of the variables in an overconstrained model do not faithfully represent
events that constitute the target situation. For example, the BELIEFS variable may take the
value that players have correct beliefs about their opponents’ preferences in the model, but
they do not in the target interaction. But relaxing the assumption of correct beliefs, the model
may be too weak to identify equilibria. So we lack confidence that agents act according to our
predictions based on equilibria.
Second, in the causal hypothesis, it is implicitly assumed that the causal mechanism which
the model describes is the only mechanism in place. In Cartwright [1989]’s words, models
“isolate capacities”. (Uskali Ma¨ki holds similar views on models as isolating tools, e.g. Ma¨ki
[2009, 2011].) But social phenomena are complex, and there may be interfering mechanisms in
the real world that distort the capacity which the model isolates (Cartwright [1999]). In terms
of the graph, interfering mechanisms would mean that it lacks nodes or edges that are relevant
in the target interaction, that is, that may change the outcome. Cartwright [2009] argues
that, even if these other mechanisms could be isolated too, economics typically lacks laws of
composition that would allow to faithfully describe how these causal mechanisms interact in the
target interaction. Furthermore, it may be in principle impossible to complete a graph. For
instance, there may be capacities that remain invisible because they are blocked by structural
circumstances from exhibiting themselves. Think of a person’s capacity for intellectual curiosity,
independence of thought, etc., in a state of malnutrition.
Before I attempt to give an answer to these challenges, it is now the time to reconsider our
case study, which will show how market designers grapple with these questions, and the way
they do so will hint at an answer to the questions.
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5 The matching market for medical residents revis-
ited
Let’s briefly recall the case of the NRMP. In the 1990s, the market was subject to various market
failures: rates of participation were low, and applicants complained that the algorithm in use
to determine the matchings would show favouritism to the hospitals at their expense, and that
it would pay to “trick the system” by handing in ROLs strategically. The NRMP directors
commissioned a new matching algorithm to alleviate the market from these failures. They set
three policy goals which the new algorithm should implement as far as possible: to give the
agents incentives to stick to the matchings, to make the resulting matchings as favourable as
possible for the applicants, and to reduce their opportunities for strategic behaviour. In the
following, I shall sketch a simple GT model of the market – more precisely, a model from a
subdiscipline of game theory called matching theory – and some of the theoretical results that
hold in this model. I shall then flesh out three lessons about how the model was manipulated,
enriched, and complemented with other tools to inform the reform of the market.
From a game theory perspective, a matching algorithm functions as a game form that defines,
for the agents’ – that is, the applicants’ and hospitals’ – preferences, a game in which their actions
are to submit ROLs (or to opt out). More formally, there is a set of students S = {s1, . . . , sm}
and a set of hospitals H = {h1, . . . , hn}. Each hospital hi offers a number of residencies which
is specified by a specific quota, qi. We assume that the agents’ preferences {s1 , . . . ,sm ,h1
, . . . ,hn} are transitive, irreflexive and complete lists for each student over the hospitals that
she had an interview with and that she finds acceptable, and for each hospital over the students
that it had interviewed and that it finds acceptable.15 The agents’ actions are to submit ROLs.
Formally, ROLs are structures just like their preferences: transitive, irreflexive, complete lists
over acceptable partners on the other side of the market. Note, however, that agents can be
strategic, viz. submit ROLs that do not truthfully reflect their preferences.
A matching algorithm is a function from combinations of ROLs to matchings, which are the
outcomes of the game. Formally, a matching µ is a subset of S×H such that any student appears
in at most one pair (i.e., is either matched or unmatched) and each hospital hi appears in at
most qi pairs (i.e., is either full or has empty places). Let’s have a look at the algorithm in use
by the time the NRMP directors commissioned the new design. As shown in Roth [1984], this
15The hospitals’ preference lists underdetermine possible preferences the hospitals may have over groups of residents
(e.g., a hospital may prefer applicant s1 to s2 if it also employs s3, but prefers s2 to s1 otherwise). It is usually assumed
that hospitals’ preferences over residents are responsive (cf. Roth [1985]): roughly, hospitals always prefer to add an
applicant si to a group of residents rather than applicant sj (or to leaving a place empty), just in case si is acceptable
and preferred to sj . This is a false assumption of the kind that will be discussed in the next section.
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algorithm is in the simple model described above equivalent to the hospital-proposing deferred
acceptance algorithm (DAAH). It therefore suffices to sketch the latter algorithm:
• In the first step, each hospital “proposes”16 to the highest-ranked students on its ROL,
until its quota is filled. Each student tentatively “accepts” the highest-ranked proposer on
her ROL, and rejects the other proposers.
• In the n-th step, each hospital subject to rejections in step n− 1 proposes to the highest-
ranked students to whom it has not previously proposed until its quota is filled. Each
student tentatively accepts the highest-ranked hospital on her ROL among the proposers
and the hospital she tentatively accepted in the previous step, and rejects the others.
• The process is repeated until there are no more proposals, at which point the students are
matched to the hospitals whose offers they are holding (or remain unmatched otherwise).
As shown in the seminal paper Gale and Shapley [1962], in the simple model described above,
this algorithm implements stable matchings with respect to the ROLs submitted. A matching
is stable if no one is matched to an unacceptable partner, and there is no blocking pair : a pair
that consists of a student and a hospital that are not matched to each other but each is higher-
ranked on the other’s ROL than some partner assigned to them in the matching. The intuition
behind the proof that DAAH implements stability is simple: under this procedure, no one can
be matched to an unacceptable partner, and there can be no blocking pair because, if a student
sj is higher ranked on a hospital hi’s ROL than a student matched to it, it must have applied
to sj at a previous step and been rejected. So sj must have ranked hi lower than her actual
match and (sj , hi) is not a blocking pair.
Note that the concept of stability and the fact that DAAH implements it are results from
matching theory; the original algorithm wasn’t designed with the help of GT models, and
consequently, it was not known to be stable in this sense. Intuitively, stability is an important
concept because, assuming that agents submit ROLs that reflect their preferences, the absence
of blocking pairs removes incentives for making deals outside the system. This suggests naturally
that stability is the formal equivalent to the directors’ first policy goal to provide incentives to
stick to the matchings.
However, this is a hypothesis on the basis of the model alone. The designers required
stronger evidence. To gain confidence that stability really does achieve this goal, they resorted
to natural experiments. Roth [2002] compares regional matching markets for physicians and
16Since Gale and Shapley [1962]’s first statement of the algorithm in the context of the “Marriage Market”, it
has been common to describe the algorithm using the predicates ‘propose’ and ‘accept’/‘reject’. This is for ease of
presentation; what is of course meant is not that the agents act in a decentralised market but the central processing
of the ROLs by the NRMP (Roth [2002]).
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surgeons in Britain. Of the eight markets investigated, six used unstable mechanisms and only
two of them had survived by the time the study was made. The two remaining markets used
stable algorithms, and both were performing well. This gave evidence to the importance of
stability. Now, it is logically possible that the survival or not of the different markets is due
to other factors than stability. In order to dispel this doubt, simple environments were created
in laboratory experiments in which the only difference would be the mechanism in use. The
experiments reproduced the field results, thus increasing the evidence that stability is key for
achieving the first goal stated by the directors.17 I take this to be the first lesson from the case
study: a simple model suggested a property which seemed to correspond to a policy goal, and
a game form that implements that property. Natural and laboratory experiments were used to
provide evidence for this hypothesis.
What about the other policy goals of the directors? The simple model above can be used
to substitute different algorithms for DAAH , and compare the outcomes with respect to the
policy goals. Take DAAS , which is the algorithm equivalent to DAAH but with the roles of
the students and the hospitals switched. As shown in Gale and Shapley [1962], DAAS produces
matchings that are stable too, but which for all students weakly Pareto-dominate any other
stable matchings with respect to their ROLs submitted, whereas for the hospitals, the matchings
from DAAH weakly Pareto-dominate all stable matchings. Since a goal of the directors was
to produce stable matchings as favourable as possible for students, we may hypothesise that
DAAS performs better on this front. Moreover, DAAS makes it a dominant strategy for all the
students to submit their true preferences. This does not hold for all hospitals. But it seems that
strategic behaviour in the market was particularly conspicuous on the part of the students, and
banning this possibility was seen as a priority. Moreover, DAAH does not make it a dominant
strategy for either side of the market to reveal their preferences (an asymmetry that stems
from the fact that hospitals take multiple students whereas students are assigned to a single
hospital). Furthermore, there will be some room for strategic behaviour because there is no
stable algorithm that makes it a dominant strategy for all agents to reveal their preferences. So
DAAS seems to be the algorithm of choice, if stability is taken as a first-order goal.
However, the above model turns out to be somewhat too naive for design purposes because
the market possesses relevant features that the model does not reflect. As described above,
there are couples among the applicants that are permitted to hand in ROLs specifying pairs of
positions. Couples are absent in the model described above. But once the model is extended
to incorporate couples, some of the theorems described above do not generalise to this case;
17A follow up experiment, mentioned in Roth [2002], added an explanation of why the two unstable markets survived:
this was less due to the unstable algorithms in use but rather due to features of these markets that the other markets
lacked – e.g., they were much smaller.
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in particular, as shown in Roth [1984], the set of stable matchings may be empty. This is the
second lesson from the NRMP: negative results were important. They revealed which features of
the market that the model fails to represent may be relevant.
So the designers knew from simple models in combination with experiments that stability is
key, but that stability cannot be guaranteed in the target market. This is not the end of the
matter. They next asked whether there is an algorithm that would produce stable matchings
whenever they exist. A simple deferred acceptance algorithm (modified to process couples’
ROLs specifying pairs of positions) would not do this job – which explains the fact that when
couples entered the market in the 1960s, rates of participation decreased.18 Roth and Peranson
[1999] designed a modified DAAS which detects blocking pairs and repairs them, if possible, at
intermediate steps. So this algorithm seeks to find stable matchings.
The Roth-Peranson algorithm is much more complex than a simple DAAS (for an insightful
graphical representation of the algorithm, cf. Roth [2013]). Many questions about its design
could not be decided through existing theorems: for example, effects of different sequencings of
proposals were not known. In order to compare the performance of different designs, computa-
tional experiments were made using ROLs submitted in previous years.
These were not the only computational experiments. The impossibility theorem above said
that the set of stable matchings could be empty in which case the Roth-Peranson algorithm of
course cannot find a stable matching. But here magnitudes matter. Computational experiments
showed that, under certain conditions that the market satisfies (not too great a proportion of
couples and sufficiently short ROLs), as the market becomes large stable matchings exist with
a high probability (Kojima et al. [2013]). The last lesson is that, where preexisting theory is
not decisive and in particular, where magnitudes matter, the designers made essential use of
computational experiments.
In fact, the NRMP has to date found stable matchings in each year of its operating. The
algorithm also performs well with respect to other policy goals, for example, it practically
makes it a dominant strategy for applicants and programmes to state their true preferences
(Roth [2013]). The algorithm was implemented in 1998 and continues to be used to date.
18Roughly, the problem is the following. Suppose DAAS is running, and the members of a couple are both tentatively
accepted by two programmes. Then, if in the next step the first (but not the second) gets displaced by a preferred
applicant, the couple applies to the next best preferred pair of positions which means that the second member of
the couple is withdrawn from the programme that had tentatively accepted her. But then blocking pairs may occur
between that programme and applicants it has rejected in order to hold the second couple member.
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6 Meeting challenges from the philosophy of science
Recall the two challenges from the philosophy of science that we encountered earlier: GT models
crucially rely on false assumptions, and they isolate mechanisms which are distorted by other
mechanisms in the real world. The lessons from the previous section together with my account
of GT models can now be applied to meet these challenges.
To be sure, in the simple matching model from the previous section, there are numerous
assumptions which are likely, or even known to be, literally false. There are couples in the
market, but the simple model assumes only individuals. Furthermore, the model makes as-
sumptions concerning information that the agents privately hold, e.g. that they have transitive
and complete preferences over agents on the other side of the market; that they are utility
maximisers; that they know the “game” they are playing (the latter two assumptions were only
implicitly made). These variables will likely not take those values in the target interaction. Do
assumptions that are likely to be false, or even known to be false, not make it a “non-starter”
to treat those assumptions as determining values in a causal graph?
I shall argue that they do not. My proposal is that, when modelling the interaction as a
game, the values of the variables are tentatively fixed. In this process, things like simplicity, and
deducibility, play a major role. For example, we started with a simple model without couples,
and investigated what the policy goals could amount to there, as well as whether they can be
implemented. So a simple model can direct attention to properties of potential importance for
realising policy goals, as well as to game forms that implement them.
However, the conditions that define the simple model are not all (known to be) satisfied in
the target interaction. This means that, when interpreting the graph of the model causally, some
values are not known (as for variables that range over private information); or, it may be known
that some values that variables take are not the values that they take in the target interaction
(as for couples). The former case is an incomplete causal graph; in it, values of some nodes are
simply not specified. And call the latter an imperfect graph, where values of some nodes are
“false”. Typically, the graphs of interest will be both imperfect and incomplete. These graphs
can be read as suggesting causal hypotheses such as, “deferred acceptance algorithms cause
agents to stick to the matchings”. In causal hypotheses that an imperfect and/or incomplete
graph suggests, the outcome may not follow deductively from its assumptions. For example, in
the hypothesis above, nothing is said about agents’ beliefs, preferences, etc., which are needed
to deduce stability. In order to confirm such hypotheses that a given game form would indeed
implement policy goals in the real world, various inference aids, such as experiments, can be
used to establish inferences from the graph to the target interaction. Here, the lessons from the
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previous section kick in – as will be discussed in more depth below.
My proposal is akin to that of Anna Alexandrova, which is not surprising, as she is concerned
with design economics, e.g. in Alexandrova [2006a,b, 2008]. She sees models as open formulae of
the form, ‘features F cause behaviours B in types of interactions x that have certain characteris-
tics’. The proposition is open because it makes no existential claim that there exists a situation
of type x. An open formula of interest could be, ‘deferred acceptance algorithms cause agents
to stick to matchings in markets where there is common knowledge of beliefs, preferences, etc.
etc.’. Models as open formulae suggest causal hypotheses about the target interaction, namely
that the target interaction is of a type where deferred acceptance algorithms cause agents to
stick to the matchings. Importantly, not all the conditions that the model specifies need go into
a causal hypothesis. It need not be assumed, for example, that there be common knowledge
of beliefs in the NRMP’s matching market. Without this assumption, the outcome may not
deductively follow in the model. Empirical methods such as lab and natural experiments, ran-
domised controlled trials, Mill’s methods, and so on, are then needed to give evidence that the
causal hypothesis does indeed hold.
I agree that the open-formula view does justice to the methodology of market design. It can
be accommodated within my causal-graphs account; Alexandrova’s open formulae correspond to
imperfect and incomplete causal graphs. I believe that there is additional value to my graphical
approach: graphs help uncover the causal structure that game theory assumes social interactions
to have and which remains obscure when stated as open formulae. Unlike open formulae, graphs
allow to show not only that, but how different game forms (‘features F’) and characteristics,
including agents’ preferences, beliefs, etc., affect model outcomes. Such model-interventions
reveal counterfactual information that is vital for design purposes because it points at just what
real-world interventions may bring about desirable outcomes.
It remains to consider inference aids more thoroughly. First, designers engage in experiments.
Experiments are used for two things in this context: to fix values, and to give evidence that in
a similar interaction to the one in question, unknown or false values do not disturb the causal
mechanism much, which the model picks out. In our case study, natural experiments provided
confidence that stable algorithms do in the real world achieve the policy goal that agents stick
to the matchings. The logic seems to be something like the following: there are different social
interactions that share some key features with the market of interest and which are likely subject
to the same or similar causal mechanism. If there are variations between the different cases,
then, if a model successfully accounts for the variations, it could be expected to predict the
behaviour of other interactions that share key features with the investigated interactions. For
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example, there could be similar markets some of which produce reliable outcomes and some of
which unravel. A model that accounts for the different outcomes, e.g. by pointing at a feature
that all the reliable markets possess but the unravelling ones do not, is likely also a good model
of a market that shares key features with the known markets. The other markets serve as natural
experiments for the market at hand. Further, laboratory experiments are used to confirm that
the difference between the markets is indeed the feature of interest that the model isolates.
What experiments do in this case is they give evidence that given values can be treated
as approximations, and that the mechanisms which the model picks out is indeed structurally
similar to the mechanism in the target interaction. They allow the inference that in markets
with similar agents this assumption doesn’t cause problems. In section 3, I emphasised that
game theory is concerned with what types of social interactions result in what types of outcomes,
because it is regularities that define types, which make such inductive inferences possible.
Designers also use the models themselves to establish inferences from the model to the
target interaction. Some versions of such aids have been noted in the philosophy of science.
To conclude, I shall discuss two such aids and show that designers use them where they are
available; but also that they are not usually readily available. First, consider what Cartwright
[1989] calls “concretization”, and Hausman [1994], “de-idealization”. I take these to be roughly
equivalent; they amount to substituting unrealistic values of variables with more realistic ones,
while preserving the outcome of the model. We encountered de-idealization when we considered
too simple a model for the market for medical residents because couples are present in the
market but not in the model. The model misrepresents the interrelated preferences of couples
and instabilities resulting from them. The designers extended the model by adding couples
to it. Now, this is not precisely de-idealizations because the outcome of the original model
is not preserved: extending the model to accommodate couples shows that a simple deferred
acceptance algorithm likely produces unstable matchings for couples, and that stable matchings
may not even exist.
So, instead of de-idealization, we have failure thereof. This is not to say that the practice
of replacing unrealistic assumptions with more realistic ones is not important. Extending the
model did lead to a modification of the algorithm. But the case shows that often, replacing
assumptions doesn’t take the form of de-idealization. In particular, it draws attention to the
importance of negative results. The impossibility result, “in markets with couples, there may not
be stable matchings”, motivated computational experiments on data to estimate magnitudes. So
the model located problems, and suggested further computational analyses to resolve the issues.
These, in turn, can prepare the ground for new theory. For example, the computational results
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suggested that there could be results proving that for large markets, it is unlikely that the set
of stable matchings be empty. This intuition was indeed proven correct: about a decade later,
Kojima et al. [2013] proved analytically the theorem that, if there are sufficiently small numbers
of couples and the ROLs are short, as a market becomes sufficiently large the probability that
a stable matching exists tends to certainty.
This method is not simply de-idealization. It rather draws a more complex picture, where
substituting a true for a false assumption changes the outcome, which in turn leads to new theory
through computational methods. Furthermore, de-idealization is not applicable for variables
that take values in private information that is not known to the designer. This leads us to the
last inference aid, which has already been mentioned in the description of how market designers
treat preferences: robustness. This refers to the procedure of deriving the same or similar results
from a wide class of models that differ in auxiliary assumptions, or from a very general model
that can accommodate different auxiliary assumptions (e.g. Gibbard and Varian [1978], Sugden
[2000], Kuorikoski and Lehtinen [2009]). Market designers make systematic use of robustness
analysis when they design game forms which implement properties for variable populations and
types of players. For instance, deferred acceptance algorithms implement stability in the simple
model above with respect to ROLs submitted, no matter whether a given agent prefers Chicago
to LA, or the other way around. Nevertheless, it is assumed that the agents’ preferences are
complete and transitive. This is a milder assumption, even though it still is an assumption that
may not hold for all agents in the market, and robustness only gets us so far.
Robustness analysis has struck some skepticism in the philosophy of science (e.g. Sugden
[2000], Alexandrova [2006b]) on the grounds that it replaces false assumptions with assump-
tions that are not less false. For my purposes, the point is merely that inference aids such as
robustness are used where they are available, but often they are not available, and so the causal
interpretation of the graph requires more confirmation from elsewhere (a similar point is made
in Alexandrova [2008]). Summing up, designers rely on inductive inferences from natural and
laboratory experiments. In addition, they engage in analytic methods such as de-idealization
and robustness, and they use computational experiments to estimate magnitudes that can’t be
inferred from the model. As Alvin Roth, the leading character of the case study, put it: “in the
service of design, experimental and computational economics are natural complements to game
theory” (Roth [2002]).
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7 Conclusion
How do economic engineers harness GT models? I have argued that GT models assume that
social interactions have a specific structure, which I depicted with the help of directed graphs.
The contribution of game theory is that it allows to systematically track how model-interventions
change model-outcomes. If the graph of a model can be interpreted as a causal graph of the
target interaction, then model-interventions inform real world interventions.
However, many assumptions made in the model may distort the real world interaction that it
is supposed to describe. In order to close the epistemic gap between the model and the real world,
designers rely on inductive inferences from natural and laboratory experiments. In addition,
they engage in analytic methods such as de-idealization and robustness, and computational
methods.
My account of GT models makes precise an intuition that various philosophers of science
have pointed at. According to Cartwright, models allow us to investigate isolated “capacities”
Cartwright [1989, 2009]. Moreover, Ma¨ki argues that models are needed to isolate causal mech-
anisms that are in effect in the real world but which are invisible-hand (e.g. Ma¨ki [2009, 2011]).
For both theorists, models isolate causal structures. One of the contributions of this paper is
to illustrate a surprising new use of the directed-graph approach to uncover this specific causal
structure for a class of GT models. I have shown how this philosophical tool can be lifted quite
naturally out of standard game-theoretic practice.
Finally, my proposal is akin to those of Mary Morgan and Cartwright who have emphasised
the fact that we do not just learn from models passively but by manipulating them (e.g. Morgan
[2002]). In the words of Cartwright [2009], “[w]e change the models, experiment on them, see
what results as assumptions are varied in relevant ways...we probe models as a means to un-
derstand how structure affects the outcomes.” This intuition can be made precise. It amounts
to model-interventions within my graphical representation. I believe that connecting insights
from the two literatures of economic engineering and causal graphs has much potential to illu-
minate economic models, and graphs provide a particularly useful analysis from the perspective
of policy-making.
This paper calls for various follow-up projects. Philosophers of science interested in economic
engineering – mainly Alexandrova and Guala – have to date mainly studied the design of radio
spectrum auctions, but not matching markets. What are the differences concerning the relation
of models and experiments in these different subdisciplines of market design, and why do they
arise? Furthermore, market designers seek to inform policy making; so in a sense it is no wonder
that an interpretation of their models, which is explicitly causal and emphasises interventions,
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sits well with this practice. In what sense do models used in market design differ from models
in other fields of economics, and can graphs shed light on models more generally?
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